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Abstract: In this paper, theoretical results from endogenous growth models (Barro, 1990) are used to
examine the role of public infrastructure in regional growth in France. Two main questions are
addressed: ( i) does public infrastructure have any effect on regional growth? (ii) can public
infrastructure reduce disparities between regions? Production functions with three inputs (private
capital and employment, public capital) are estimated from regionalised series of public and private
sectors capital using panel data econometrics methods for the 22 regions of France for the period
1982-1993. A Cobb-Douglas production function highlights a positive impact of public capital on
regional growth, even if we take into account of data-related effects and of possible simultaneity in
determining regional output and regional public capital. Introduction of a trans-log form for evaluating
region-specific elasticities shows that the positive effect of public capital increases with the regional
wealth. In France then, while public capital seems to stimulate regional growth, it apparently doesn’t
reduce interregional disparities.
JEL classification: R11, H54, C232
1. Introduction
Among the issues of regional development and its policy tools is the question of how public capital
investment affects regional growth. Such questions has often focused on the role of transport
infrastructure and its implications in terms of lower transport costs for goods and of accessibility
(Gasser and Navarre, 1991;  Bonnafous, 1993;  Fritsch, 1997). Yet, the analysis of public spending
effects on growth is recently reviewed by endogenous growth theories (for an overview see Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 1995). Some endogenous growth models focus on positive externalities generated by
public services and therefore by public spending (Barro, 1990). There are externalities because public
services can affect the productivity of firms without those firms directly bearing the costs. These are
productive public services then in the sense that, for given private inputs stocks, they reduce firms'
production costs or increase output levels.
During the same decade several empirical studies sought the effects of public infrastructure on both
national and local growth, especially at the US state scale. Initial national ( Aschauer, 1989) and
regional ( Munnell, 1990) investigations based on three-inputs production functions indicated that
public expenditure had a positive effect on firms' output or productivity. However, the statistical
robustness of those initial findings was questioned (Eberts, 1990; Gramlich, 1994). One issue concerns
the measurement of the eviction effect engendered by public investment and the sense of the
statistically observed relation. The econometric techniques used were also contested, leading to the
initial results being revised downwards.
As concerns the sense of causality of the relation, the argument is that while public infrastructure may
be productive, it is financed by taxes and is therefore dependent on taxpayers' income and so on
production. We have to consider this simultaneity when we want to measure the net effect of public
investment on growth. Such bias is classically corrected by simultaneous equations models (Duffy-
Deno and  Eberts, 1991;  Tatom, 1993; Ford and  Poret, 1991). In the case of the United States,
introduction of this correction greatly reduces and even totally cancels out the positive effect of public
capital on growth.
The second important criticism of the initial studies revealing a positive effect of public expenditures
on growth relates to the common trend of the variables, how they change over time. Tatom (1993)
claims the relation identified by Aschauer (1989) or Munnell (1990) merely reflects common trends of
production and of public investment during the analyzed period, i.e. their concomitant pattern of
change. These are serious limits of the tested model and of the results obtained by the ordinary least
squares method (OLS). To take into account of the time series dimension of variables it is necessary to3
work on their stationarity, the change in their distribution over time. After correction for this bias, the
effect of public investment on growth in the United States disappears (Tatom, 1991, 1993; Hulten and
Schwab, 1991).
Finally, in studies of American states, urban areas or regions, variables are observed in time and
space. Holtz-Eakin (1994) reports that using ordinary least squares on this type of data overlooks the
possibilities of a common trend between the variables and the impact of regional characteristics in
explaining productivity (their endowment in natural resources, size, location, climate, etc.). Some
studies concerning American states or urban areas used panel data econometrics methods and allowed
for time series and cross-sectional dimensions (in these cases the individuals are regions). They found
that public sector investment has no effect, or even in some instances a negative effect, on local growth
(Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Evans and Karras, 1994; Andrews and Swanson, 1995; Moomaw et al., 1995).
Thus when statistical methods are more suited to the analyzed series are used, public spending seems
to have a lesser effect on local growth in areas of the United States. In Europe and in France, there are
just few studies concerning this issue at local level, particularly because few data sets are available.
For example, regional public capital is not recorded in any official data base. However, pioneering
work by Fritsch (1995) has put together such series and, with particular specifications, shown that in
France public capital has a positive effect on regional growth.
In view of the importance of regional development policy in France, two questions of the role of public
infrastructure in regional growth are addressed:
- Does public sector capital have any effect on regional growth? Is there a public capital
externality, as endogenous growth models assume?
- Do public sector investments reduce regional disparities, which may be seen as one goal of the
regional development policy?
This paper addresses these two questions in three stages. First, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas regional
production function with three inputs using panel data techniques and attempting to evaluate the
presence of public capital externality. Secondly, the same form of production function is introduced in
a simultaneous equations system, where the second equation explains the stock of regional public
capital by the regional output and the local taxation rate. This second stage of estimation specifies the
direction of causality of the 'regional growth - public infrastructure' relation. In the third and final stage
we test a trans-log function which is more flexible than the Cobb-Douglas function. The trans-log
function distinguishes between public-sector capital production elasticities by region and indicates to
what extent public investment can reduce regional disparities.4
In addition to series on regional gross product (GDP) and regional employment from the French
national statistics office (INSEE, 1995), our analyses are based on original regional series of public
and private sectors capital. We built them with data from Capital Accounts (INSEE, 1994), Tax
Department and Public Accounts Department (construction of series is detailled in appendix). For
some technical reasons (change in the national accounting base in 1980), the present study concerns
regional GDP for the period 1982-1993.
2. A Cobb-Doublas production function with public capital as input
Endogenous growth models with public capital externalities ( Barro, 1990) are usually based on
production function with three inputs, two of which are private factors ( labour and private sector
capital) and the third, public infrastructure, is financed by the public sector. The Cobb-Douglas
function is the most frequently used. It gives a direct reading of production elasticities and returns to
scale and allows easy discussion of whether public capital externalities are present or not. This factor
yields externalities if returns to scale are decreasing or constant for private factors and increasing for
private and public factors as a whole (Barro, 1990).
Then the regional production function takes the following form:
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where Y is the vector of Yrt, the GDP for region r at period t; K, L and Kpu are, respectively, the stock
of private sector capital, labor and the stock of public capital associated with region r and period t; e is
the error-term.
After  linearising by logarithmic transformation, the model takes the following form and can be
estimated using econometric techniques for linear models:
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The aim is to test the model of endogenous growth with public capital which, because of the existence
of public capital externalities, considers that returns to scale are constant in private inputs (a + b = 1)
and increasing for private and public inputs together (a + b + g > 1). For this reason production was
estimated first with no constraint on parameters and then with a constraint of constant returns to scale
on private inputs. Table 1 shows the results for the 22 regions of France for the period 1982-93 using
classical panel data econometric methods.
Panel data have two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension — which is a spatial one here since the
individuals observed are regions — and a time-series dimension. Analysis of such data can5
discriminate an "cross-sectional effect" and a " time-series effect" in economic phenomena. Four main
estimators can be used to compute a relation in this context (Greene, 1997). The first is obtained by
simple regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) of all the variables. The total variance is used in
this case. A second estimator is obtained by simple regression on the computed means of endogenous
and exogenous variables over the period for each individual. This is the between estimator which is not
used here because of the small number of observations (22 regions). A third method consists in
applying OLS to a model with variables transformed by calculating deviations from the individual
mean, which controls the characteristics specific to each individual that are not introduced in the
estimated relation. This is called the fixed effects model as opposed to the random effects model. The
random effects model assumes individual constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units. Unlike in the fixed effects model, OLS estimator is not consistent and the generalised
least square (GLS) technique is then required. An Hausman test is used to choose between fixed and
random effects models.
Table 1 - Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (All French regions, 1982-1993)

















































R² 0,992 0,999 0,990 0,645 0,960 0,960
Hausman test
(Chi-square value)
- 23,731 - 72,638
t-values in brackets.
** : significant at the 1 % level; * : significant at the 5 % level.
In the unconstrained model, parameters determined by the ordinary least squares (OLS) are consistent
with those classically found: production elasticity of private sector capital is closed to 0.3, labor
elasticity is slightly less than 0.6, and public capital elasticity 0.16. Returns to scale are therefore
decreasing for private factors (the sum of elasticities is equal to 0.914) and slightly increasing for all
three factors (the sum of elasticities is equal to 1.072).6
The fixed effects model results show labor elasticity is strengthened and public capital elasticity
becomes very high.  It exceeds that of private sector capital, what it is surprising. We will discuss that
further. In the random model results, labour elasticity is close to that found with OLS while public
capital elasticity is mid-way between the values found for the previous specifications. Hausman test
leads to choose a specification with fixed effects rather than random effects. It seems that there are
specific regional effects. And when these effects are controlled, the employment level and, to a lesser
extent, the public capital stock determine the level of regional output. Returns to scale for all factors
are largely increasing, with the sum of elasticities equal to 1.44.
Introducing a constraint of constant returns in the private inputs does not change the elasticity of
private capital estimated from the model estimating by OLS. However in this case, employment
elasticity is higher than before (close to 0.7). The contribution of public capital to regional production
falls, even if it remains significantly positive. Variance explained by the model with constraints is far
greater than that explained by the unconstrained model. The unconstrained model therefore seems the
best specification, as confirmed by Fischer test for comparing the two specifications.1
With fixed effects model parameters are very stable whatever the model, unconstrained or constrained,
we use. The only exception is the employment elasticity of which the value is closer to classical value
but is nonetheless close to 0.8. Hausman test shows a preference for the fixed effect to the random
effect model and Fisher test leads to choose the constrained model rather than the unconstrained
model.2 It is important to observe, in this specification that the tests lead us to use, public capital has a
very strong and highly significant impact on production.
Finally, the nature of the data used and the results of Hausman and Fisher tests lead us to use to retain
the fixed effects model with constraint on private inputs returns to scale. Then labor elasticity is in the
order of 0.8; private sector capital elasticity is 0.2 and public capital elasticity 0.3. Returns to scale in
the private and public inputss are therefore strongly increasing.
The elasticity values obtained are surprising. Employment elasticity seems higher than what is
classically found in the literature. This may be explained in part by the method of regional GDP
calculation by INSEE. Regional distribution of output between different plants of the same firm is
carried out "proportionally to the payroll" ( Dejonghe and  Vincenau, 1996, p. 22). This probably
overestimates the relation between GDP and employment at regional level. As we retained the model
                                                
1 The probability of using the unconstrained model whereas the constrained model is better specified is less than
1%. F(1.261) is 11.9 while its critical value is 6.63 at the 1% level of significance.7
with constraint  a +  b = 1, the way regional GDP is calculated may also account for the relative
weakness of private sector capital elasticity.
This remark may help to answering the questions raised by the fact that public capital is proportionally
higher in our estimate than private capital. Our results are nonetheless close to those found by
Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) (who did not use panel data econometrics), and which were
severely criticized by Gramlich (1994) and Tatom (1993). If public capital elasticity is greater than
private capital elasticity, economic agents should not have any questions about financing public capital
through taxation. However, this reasoning is only valid if individuals are able to measure the benefits
they derive from public sector investments. But if public capital affects production, this effect is
brought about by an externality, which, by definition, is not taken into account by the agents. It is not
therefore a direct effect. In France, where there is extensive public sector, high elasticity of production
relative to public capital is less surprising.
Beyond these remarks, the fact remains that the public capital elasticity obtained in our study is high
(0.3) and close to the "stratospheric" values for which Gramlich (1994) criticises Aschauer (1989) and
Munnell (1990). Further investigations on longer series are necessary to confirm this parameter value.
However, it is worth noting that in France public capital seems to have a positive effect on regional
output levels although just how large an effect is difficult to say.
3. Causality of the relation between public infrastructure and regional growth
In the previous section we assumed that public and private inputs explained regional output. One of the
main criticisms addressed to studies on the role of public capital in regional development relates to the
causality of the relation. If a region is rich and productive, it is able to finance a large stock of public
capital. The region's wealth thus determines most of the public capital stock ( Herrera, 1996).
Estimations of production functions as in the previous section cannot alone determine the direction of
cause and effect of the relation between regional output and public capital.
Following Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) we have sought to determine the causality of the relation
between public capital and production by constructing a simultaneous equations model, i.e. a system
where the variables explained are interdependent. For this, the local taxation rate of each region is
introduced to explain the region's ability to invest in public capital. The model of simultaneous
equations takes the form:
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where log (Vatr) is the logarithm of GDP of region r at period t,
log (Ltr) is the logarithm of employment of region r at period t,
log (Ktr) is the logarithm of private capital of region r at period t,
log (Kputr) is the logarithm of public capital of region r at period t,
tximptr is the mean local taxation rate of region r at period t.
This model involves estimating a three-inputs Cobb-Douglas regional production function where the
stock of public capital is explained by the output of a region and the mean local taxation rate, in order
to account for the role of local taxation in public sector investment in a given region. Such a model can
be estimated by instrumental variables methods such as three-stage least squares, 3SLS ( Maddala,
1992; Greene, 1997).
Before estimating the model, we test the exogeneity of endogenous variables. This is designed to test
for the presence or absence of dual causality between the endogenous variables of the model. We used
exogenous test with estimations of the augmented regression, based on the specification test of
Hausman (Maddala, 1992; Greene, 1997). This involves the estimations of the different equations,
introducing together the estimate value of the tested variable obtained with the regression on the
instruments and its observed value. If the coefficients of the estimated variables are significantly
different from zero, the hypothesis of exogenous variables is rejected.
Table 2 - Exogeneity test of GDP and public capital
Initial model Fixed effects model
GDP Public Capital GDP Public capital
Fischer test (F) 10,14 3,264 0,015 2,143
Degrees of freedom (1,259) (1,260) (1,259) (1,260)
When variables are not transformed to allow for the nature of data, the results of such tests (Table 2)
lead to conclude that GDP and public capital are endogenous (respectively at the 1% level and at the
10% level).3 Three-stage least squares method is therefore required to estimate this system. When
                                                
3 Critical values of F (1.259) and F (1.260) are 6.63 at the 1% threshold, 3.84 at the 5% threshold and 2.71% at
the 10% threshold.9
variables are transformed to obtain a fixed effect model, the variables explained there is no more
endogeneity. It is not therefore necessary to use the 3SLS method for estimating the model.
Then three estimations were made. Their results are shown in Table 3: the first is by OLS on
untransformed variables, the second solves the same model with 3SLS and the third is OLS estimates
only of the fixed effects model (3SLS is not necessary).
Table 3 – Simultaneous equations model (All French regions, 1982-1993)
Initial model Fixed effects model
OLS 3SLS OLS
Three inputs production function equation
Intercept 1,40 **    (7,79) 2,06 **    (7,76)
Labor 0,59 **  (18,04) 0,71 **  (15,52) 0,92 **  (10,82)
Private capital 0,32 **  (15,59) 0,31 **  (14,92) 0,21 **    (6,73)
Public capital 0,16 **    (5,96) 0,04         (0,93) 0,32 **  (15,70)
R² 0,99 0,99 0,89
Root MSE4 0,08 0,08 0,03
Public capital equation
Intercept 1,17 **    (5,47) 1,13 **    (5,28)
GDP 0,86 **  (83,88) 0,86 **  (83,64) 1,29 **  (18,35)
Taxation rate 0,04 **  (13,36) 0,04 **  (13,40) 0,03 **   (8,03)
R² 0,96 0,96 0,84




** : significant at the 1 % level; * : significant at the 5 % level.
Results for the public capital equation show that, whatever the model specification and the econometric
method, the stock of regional public capital is largely explained by the regional GDP and the taxation
rate, with relatively high R². This confirms that there is a causal link between the level of public capital
and regional output.
Results for the production function are identical, of course, for OLS estimates and, as seen above,
public capital has a positive effect on regional production. On the other hand, the use of the 3SLS
estimator on  untransformed variables greatly modifies the production function parameters: public
capital elasticity is no longer significantly different from zero and employment elasticity comes to 0.7.
The parameter associated with private sector capital is significant and remains stable at 0.3.
                                                
4 The root of mean square error, compared with the mean of the variable explained, indicates the quality of
estimation: the more reliable it is, the better quality the estimation.10
The positive effect of public capital on regional growth apparently vanishes then when the effect of
regional wealth on the level of public capital is controlled. Nonetheless, such a result is obtained with
a specification of the model that does not control the effects specific to each region. This is an
important limitation given the nature of the data involved. When allowance is made for this, the 3SLS
method, designed to correct simultaneity bias does not seem necessary and the previous result of a
positive effect of public capital is maintained.
4. Inputs substitution and regional production elasticities: the trans-log function
The functional form chosen in the previous estimations, although consistent with the theoretical model
of growth, is not flexible. Inputs are considered to be substitutable and production elasticity for each
factor is considered to be identical for all regions over the entire period. The  trans-logarithmic
production function is, from this point of view, much more flexible than the Cobb-Douglas function. It
also removes assumptions that inputs can be substituted and production is homogeneous.
A trans-logarithmic production function takes the following general form (Christensen et al., 1973):
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Elasticities are therefore no longer fixed and identical for all regions and periods. Input elasticity does
not depend only on the quantity of the factor available any more but also on the quantities of the other
inputs available in the region in each period.
The trans-log function with three inputs takes the following form in this context:
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This model was estimated without constraint for all French regions over the period 1982-93. The
results are shown in Table 4.
Hausman test indicates the fixed effects model should be chosen. As with the Cobb-Douglas function,
there seem to be significant regional effects. For the fixed effects model, the coefficient of the crossed-11
product terms are invariably positive and significant, the three inputs considered are therefore
substitutes.5 In this sense, the Cobb-Douglas function is not completely unsuitable for our study, even
if, when OLS estimates are made, private capital appears complementary to both public capital and to
employment.
Table 4 - Three inputs trans-log production function with three inputs
(All French regions, 1982-1993)
OLS Fixed effects Random effects
Number of observations 264 264 264
Intercept -0,166      (-0,00) 8,296 ** (3,37)
K 4,507 **  (6,08) 2,294 ** (3,53) 0,690 (1,37)
L -4,695 ** (-5,57) -8,433 ** (-5,44) -1,384 * (-2,09)
Kpu -0,705      (-0,71) 1,220 *   (2,27) 0,325 (0,69)
L² 0,0055       (1,12) 0,031 *   (2,04) 0,033 ** (3,87)
K² 0,112       (1,75) -0,254 ** (-3,01) 0,014 (0,215)
Kpu² 0,0244       (0,30) -0,253 ** (-5,54) -0,092 * (-2,53)
K * Kpu -0,359 ** (-3,75) 0,241 *   (2,35) 0,026 (0,30)
Kpu * L 0,449 **  (3,61) 0,269 *   (2,20) 0,206 * (2,03)
K * L -0,146      (-1,41) 0,226 *   (2,10) -0,105 (-1,33)
R² 0,995 0,999 0,991
Hausman test (Chi-square value) 57,296
t-values in brackets.
** : significant at the 1 % level; * : significant at the 5 % level.
Production elasticities of each input cannot be directly observed in the case of trans-log production
functions and require further calculation (the principle of this is recalled above, cf. equation 6). Mean
input elasticity is calculated for each region for the OLS estimator and the fixed effect model (Table
5). Even so the elasticities obtained with the trans-log form must be interpreted with care. They are
very sensitive to the period of observation and the unit of measurement of regional input endowments.6
The trans-log functional form nevertheless shows regional disparities in production elasticities of the
different factors. Elasticities calculated from OLS but, above all, for fixed effects model confirm the
strong impact of employment on production in all regions. Elasticity of this factor may vary in OLS
from 0.51 for Franche-Comté 7 to 1.2 for Ile-de-France, emphasising the over-productivity of labour in
this region (this is also the only region where private sector capital elasticity is slightly negative).8 We
                                                
5 Parameter bij with i _ j gives an indication of the substitution between factors: if bij > 0, factors i and j are
substitutable; if bij < 0, factors i and j are complementary.
6  Fritsch (1995) finds very different results to ours for the period 1978-1989 and with series constructed
differently.
7 Excluding Corsica where it is only 0.2.
8 Labour elasticities here are always very high while private capital elasticities are often low. A number of
technical arguments for this are presented above.12
also obtain a high labor elasticity and a low private sector capital elasticity for certain wealthy regions
such as Rhône-Alpes and PACA. By contrast, private sector capital elasticity is comparatively high in
Champagne, Haute-Normandie and Basse-Normandie as well as in Alsace, Picardie and Limousin.
Table 5 - Mean regional elasticities of the three inputs (1982-1993)
OLS elasticities Fixed effects elasticities
Region L K Kpu L K Kpu
Ile-de-France 1,18 -0,09 -0,25 2,41 -0,03 0,51
Champagne 0,52 0,50 -0,55 1,17 0,10 0,45
Picardie 0,58 0,45 -0,54 1,30 0,07 0,45
Haute Normandie 0,57 0,49 -0,64 1,40 -0,07 0,50
Centre 0,71 0,33 -0,45 1,48 0,11 0,43
Basse Normandie 0,54 0,47 -0,50 1,17 0,15 0,43
Bourgogne 0,62 0,40 -0,47 1,25 0,18 0,38
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0,89 0,19 -0,46 1,78 0,05 0,37
Lorraine 0,72 0,35 -0,54 1,52 0,03 0,40
Alsace 0,57 0,47 -0,58 1,33 0,02 0,47
Franche-Comté 0,51 0,52 -0,59 1,09 0,12 0,38
Pays de Loire 0,87 0,18 -0,35 1,61 0,21 0,33
Bretagne 0,87 0,15 -0,29 1,51 0,32 0,27
Poitou 0,68 0,33 -0,41 1,21 0,31 0,28
Aquitaine 0,81 0,22 -0,35 1,52 0,23 0,35
Midi-Pyrénées 0,80 0,23 -0,35 1,46 0,26 0,31
Limousin 0,54 0,46 -0,45 0,81 0,44 0,17
Rhône-Alpes 1,00 0,08 -0,39 2,02 0,02 0,41
Auvergne 0,68 0,35 -0,44 1,17 0,31 0,24
Languedoc 0,80 0,23 -0,36 1,33 0,35 0,21
PACA 0,97 0,10 -0,36 1,81 0,15 0,31
Corse 0,19 0,77 -0,63 0,16 0,50 0,12
France 1,75 -0,59 -0,01 3,28 -0,01 0,40
Elasticity of public capital from OLS estimates is always negative, contrary to the results obtained
with the same method for a Cobb-Douglas production function. On the other hand, the fixed effect
model leads to consistently high, positive public capital elasticities, whatever the region. There are
marked variations in elasticity between regions: it seems that the more developed regions are, the
greater the impact on production of public capital. The elasticity of public capital appears to be an
increasing function of the level of wealth of the region: public capital elasticity is 0.51 in Ile-de-France
but only 0.17 in Limousin.9 It should be noticed finally that public capital elasticity is generally higher
than private sector capital elasticity in the more developed regions, whereas private sector capital has
a greater impact in less developed regions.
                                                
9 Regional elasticities of public capital obtained with the trans-log function are even higher than those found for
all the regions with the Cobb-Douglas function. Such values become difficult to interpret and only the differences
can then be analysed.13
Although trans-log function estimations can confirm the positive effect of public capital on regional
growth (when region-specific characteristics are controlled), this effect does not necessarily entail a
reduction in disparities between regions in terms of production. Public capital investment policy seems
to favour the development of regions that are already rich. However, it is worth noting that it also acts
positively on the growth of less well-to-do regions, even if its impact is of more limited scope than in
rich regions.
5. Conclusion
To deal with the question of the role of public capital in regional growth we used in this paper a
production function approach. To test the existence of public capital externality at a regional level of
analysis we introduced the public capital as an input. We used French regional data for the period
1982-1993 and panel data econometric methods to treat both time-series and cross-sectional
dimensions. Two forms of production function were tested: the Cobb-Douglas function, classically
used in this type of approach, and the more flexible trans-logarithmic function.
Our results first shown the non-negligible role played by public capital stock in regional growth, even
if we used a simultaneous equations model to allow for any eviction effect may, with certain
reservations, reduce its scope. As endogenous growth models suggest ( Barro, 1990), public capital
does therefore engender a positive externality in all French regions over the study period. This
conclusion is similar to that of Fritsch (1995), for different period and series, but contrasts with the
results obtained by the same methods in the United States:  Holtz-Eakin (1994) or Andrews and
Swanson (1995) show that the introduction of fixed effects in the relation between growth of US states
and public capital reduces or cancels out the impact of public capital. This divergence in results can
be explained by differences in the structure of public capital in these two countries. While U.S. public
capital is mainly formed by road infrastructure, in France the share of educational infrastructure is
higher.10 Garcia-Mila and MacGuire (1992) show that education has a greater effect on the output of
US states than transport infrastructure. To test this hypothesis, it would be helpful to break down
regional stocks of public capital by function.
                                                
10 Roads represented almost one third of U.S. civil public capital in 1991 and educational structures less than
15% ( Tatom, 1993;  Gramlich, 1994). In France the distribution by main non-military investment sector
programmes given by the public accounts department showed for that same year that education and training
received 30% of state investment as against 24% for transport and telecommunications (INSEE, 1995). Even if
term-by-term comparison of these data calls for caution, the differences are sufficient to suggest the greater
importance of transport networks in public investment policy in the United States compared with France.14
Even if results need to be handled with care, estimations using the trans-log function suggest public
capital plays only a moderate role in reducing regional disparities. Industrial regions, which also have a
high degree of urbanisation, seem to benefit more intensely from positive effects of public investment.
Investment in public capital appears to be able to promote national growth, reinforcing the dynamism of
regions having attained a high level of development. However, it does not seem to be capable to
counteract forces that concentrate activities and regional growth and may even contribute to these
effects. Thus our results raise doubts about the impact of development policies designed to balance
regional dynamics through public sector investment.
The surprising level of elasticities obtained with the series and methods have been commented upon
several times: high elasticity for labor, low elasticity for private sector capital and very high elasticity
for public capital. Further inquiry is necessary to confirm these findings. Some improvement could be
made by increasing the length of the series used. Other improvement might be made to the way the
series are constructed, especially with regard to that constructed by INSEE for regional output.
Moreover, the break down of public capital by type of function (transport, educational infrastructure,
etc.) or by the type of financing agency (central or local government) could further debate on the levels
of public capital elasticity obtained.
Finally the presence of fixed effects, in all our estimations,  emphasises the importance of regional
characteristics in the relation between output and public capital. When these characteristics are
controlled, the impact of public capital in explaining regional GDP is enhanced. We can think that
many explanatory factors for the regional production level are missing from the relation tested. There
is cause to investigate these factors and in particular the impact of interregional mobility of inputs and
agglomeration economies.15
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF REGIONAL DATA
Some data in this paper are from INSEE (French Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies) regional
accounts (INSEE, 1995). This is the case for regional GDP and employment. As the regional accounts
do not include indicators of private and public capital stocks, these were constructed for the 22 regions
of France for the period 1982-1993.
1. For private capital stock, the INSEE draws up a detailed annual Capital Account and has
constructed a long series of such accounts to be integrated in the National Accounts (INSEE, 1994).
The national private capital stock we used here includes reproducible assets, excluding housing, for all
sectors except public sector. Local business tax returns provide an approximation of the capital stock
of firms located in a region. The rental value of capital (land or otherwise) held by firms is one
component of the gross base for local business tax. It was considered that the rental values liable to
land tax and rental values of "plant and equipment" provide a suitable approximation to the capital
used. They were used as an indicator of the inter-regional distribution of national private capital. The
two-year gap between company returns and the actual holding of these values was allowed for.
2. National public capital stock was based on reproducible assets, except for housing, in the public
sector available in the Capital Accounts (INSEE, 1994). Although INSEE does not directly provide
regional stocks of public capital, the Public Accounts Department does report investments by local
authorities and central government in each of the 22 regions since 1971. Regional investment by central
government in this series is very incomplete (about 75% is broken down among regions). Regional
stocks of public capital cannot be reconstituted from these investments. However, they can provide an
approximation of the relative weight of each region in public investment as a whole. For this reason the
national stock of public capital of a year  t is divided among regions in proportion to the sum of
investment by central government and local authorities in the region between 1971 and the date t in
question. These investments are deflated and depreciated linearly at 5%.11
3. As a supplement to the previous two indicators, information provided by the Tax Department is
used to reconstitute local taxation rates which are evaluated from communal bases and the products of
four local taxes: built land tax,  unbuilt land tax, housing tax and business tax. The mean rate of
regional taxation is measured by the ratio between the sum of products of the four taxes and the sum of
the bases of the same taxes.
                                                
11 This depreciation rate corresponds to a 20-year life-time for public capital. With a depreciation rate of 2%,
giving a 50 year life-time, the results for regional stocks of public capital are much the same.